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25X1A	1. USSR SLIGHTLY MODIFIES DISARMAMENT POSITION OF 30 APRIL					
	At a bilateral meeting on 7 June with the American delegation to the London disarmament talks, Soviet delegate Zorin read from an "informal" document "just received" from Moscow in response to recent American suggestions. Elaborating on the USSR's disarmament position as stated on 30 April, Zorin made the following points:					
	(a) The USSR continues to insist that a preliminary agreement must specify subsequent and more comprehensive reductions in force levels than the figure of 2,500,000 for the US and USSR as proposed by the US.					
	(b) The USSR has no objection to a method of listing specific categories of hardware to be cut rather than using a general percentage figure, but continues to feel that defense expenditures could be cut by 15 percent under a preliminary agreement.					
	(c) Only a "complete and unconditional renunciation" of the use of nuclear weapons will be satisfactory. Zorin characterized the American desire to stop the manufacture of these weapons under adequate inspection as simply "legalizing" their possession and use"a bargain to which the Soviet government cannot be a partner."					
	(d) While sticking to the idea of agreeing separately and without delay to the cessation of nuclear tests, Zorin showed some flexibility by accepting in principle the US concept of a temporary suspension. However, he argued that a ten-month suspension period might be used to cover preparations for another test series and that only a period of two to					

three years would have meaning.

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in an inspection system, ground control posts would not be

(e) He reaffirmed the Soviet position that

permitted at airfields until the US and USSR force-levels were reduced well below 2,500,000.

- (f) He continued to push for troop reductions in the NATO and Warsaw Pact areas of Europe and reductions by a third of American, British, and Soviet forces in East and West Germany.
- (g) Apparently seeking to exploit differences between the United States and other NATO members on the question of a European aerial inspection zone, the Soviet delegate maintained that such a zone should be expanded rather than contracted.

In the course of the meeting, Zorin noted that the American suggestion that the subcommittee talks should be at the foreign ministers level after progress had been made "had been the subject of discussion in Moscow." He asked when such meetings should be held and what preparations should be made, and indicated Moscow felt the need for consideration of "political problems" by the great powers outside of the subcommittee. He added that the USSR's position on German reunification had not changed.

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	2,.	NEW FRENCH-TUNISIAN CLASHES
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		Four clashes on 7 June between
		French and Tunisian military units,
		resulting in eight French and six
		Tunisian dead, point up the serious-
		ness of French-Tunisian tension. The French embassy
		claims that these incidents were incited by Algerian refu-
		gees aided by former members of the Tunisian fellagha,
		and that some Tunisian officials have followed a provoca-
25X1A		tive course.

French military commanders strongly resent Tunisian premier Bourghiba's insistence that Tunisian approval be obtained before French troops leave their barracks. The American ambassador in Tunis believes that further serious incidents can be avoided only if France accepts Bourghiba's proposal, reiterated on 6 June, for the withdrawal of French troops to the Bizerte area where France would be permitted to maintain a base.

Comment Unusual activity by Neo-Destour youth groups since the 31 May clash in north-eastern Tunisia may indicate that the Tunisians are preparing for widespread guerrilla action against French units.

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4.	RESIGNATION	OF	<b>IRAQI</b>	PRIME	MINISTER	NURI SAID

The resignation of Iraqi prime minister Nuri Said and his cabinet on 8 May pres sages a cabinet shake-up rather than a change of government. Formation of a new cabinet may be delayed until 13 June.

Nuri, who took office in December 1955, is probably attempting to lessen popular

discontent by reshuffling ministerial posts and dropping certain unpopular members such as the competent minister of finance and education, Khalil Kanna. Nuri has relied heavily on Kanna.

American-educated, pro-Western Fadhil Jamali may receive the post of foreign minister. Jamali is prominent among those who are seeking the leadership of the important Shia Muslim community following the death on 6 June of Salih Jabr, Iraq's foremost Shia Muslim statesman.

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5. INDONESIA REPORTEDLY STEPPING UP EFFORTS TO OBTAIN ORBIT ASSISTANCE

As a result of mounting economic difficulties and perhaps pressure from President Sukarno, the Indonesian government apparently feels compelled to speed up efforts to obtain assistance from the Sino-Soviet bloc. According to a Chinese Communist press report from Djakarta, the government is about to ask parliament to ratify the \$100,000,000 aid  agreement signed with the Soviet Union last September.	
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